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Open access under CC BY license.Glossary
Autocorrelation: an association across space or time in the state of the
environment. Positive autocorrelation (which is our focus here) implies that
environmental conditions tend to be more similar between locations and times
that are close together, rather than far apart.
Cognitive bias: a consistent deviation from an accurate perception or
judgement of the world. Note that this is a psychological phenomenon that
may or may not lead to irrational behaviour.
Contrast effect: a change in the perceptual, physiological, or behavioural
response to a given stimulus caused by simultaneous or recent exposure to
other stimuli in the same dimension. Here we consider successive contrast
effects, in which the response to current conditions is enhanced by previous
exposure to worse conditions (a positive contrast effect) or diminished by
previous exposure to better conditions (a negative contrast effect). For
example, honeybees trained to expect a 50% sucrose solution are more likely
to abandon that reward source when it only delivers a 20% solution, compared
to honeybees always rewarded with a 20% solution [89].
Decision rule: a description (without specifying the underlying neural
mechanisms) of the relationship between an internal or external stimulus
and the choices an individual will make.
Ecological rationality: the fit between a particular decision rule and the
statistical structure of the environment in which it evolved.
Environmental heterogeneity: variability in (external) environmental condi-
tions over space (spatial heterogeneity) and/or time (temporal heterogeneity).
Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): a principle of rational choice
stating that if an individual prefers an option A when given the choice between
A and B, then it will also prefer A when given the choice between A, B, and a
less attractive (i.e., irrelevant) option C.
Irrational behaviour: acting in a way that is not optimal. In the context of
evolutionary theory, rationality – sometimes called biological rationality (B-
rationality), to distinguish it from economic rationality (E-rationality) [90–92] –
does not imply conscious consideration of different options, but merely
behaving in a way that maximizes expected benefit.
Outcome bias: a pattern of decision-making that apparently deviates from the
predictions of rational choice theory. Note that this definition makes no
assumptions about underlying cognitive processes.
Path-independence: a principle of rational choice stating that the decisions of
an individual should only depend on its knowledge about the current state of
the world (including itself), not on past states.
Rational choice theory: an economic theory giving an axiomatic definition ofModels and experiments on adaptive decision-making
typically consider highly simplified environments that
bear little resemblance to the complex, heterogeneous
world in which animals (including humans) have
evolved. These studies reveal an array of so-called cog-
nitive biases and puzzling features of behaviour that
seem irrational in the specific situation presented to
the decision-maker. Here we review an emerging body
of work that highlights spatiotemporal heterogeneity
and autocorrelation as key properties of most real-world
environments that may help us understand why these
biases evolved. Ecologically rational decision rules
adapted to such environments can lead to apparently
maladaptive behaviour in artificial experimental set-
tings. We encourage researchers to consider environ-
ments with greater complexity to understand better
how evolution has shaped our cognitive systems.
Abandon the urge to simplify everything, to look for
formulas and easy answers, and begin to think multi-
dimensionally . . . appreciate the fact that life is com-
plex (M. Scott Peck [1])
The origins of irrational behaviour
Patterns of decision-making in humans reveal some strik-
ing deviations from economically rational expectations [2–
4]. These include distorted beliefs about external events
[5,6], inconsistent preferences that are altered by past
experience [7] and current context [8], and apparent viola-
tions of the axioms of rational choice theory [9,10]. Such
deviations may be caused by cognitive biases [11] (see
Glossary); here we focus on the behavioural outcomes
(outcome biases [12]) because we make no assumptions
about the underlying psychological or physiological
mechanisms. Mounting evidence suggests that analogous
biases exist in other organisms. For example, slime moulds
violate regularity [13], domestic dogs show negative con-
trast effects [14], and honeybees behave pessimistically1364-6613     
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quirks, our biases appear to have deep evolutionary roots.
This observation seems difficult to reconcile with the fun-
damental biological concept of natural selection as an
optimising process. Why would evolution produce such
apparently irrational behaviour?(economically) rational behaviour.
Regularity: a principle of rational choice stating that the frequency with which
an individual chooses option A, when given a choice between A, B, and C,
cannot be higher than the frequency of choosing A when given a choice
between only A and B.
Transitivity: a principle of rational choice stating that if an individual prefers
option A in a choice between A and B, and option B in a choice between B and
C, then it must prefer A in a choice between C and A.
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of deviating from the optimal, fitness-maximising decision
are negligible, and/or that constraints in the mechanisms
underlying decision-making prevent natural selection
from reaching this optimum. Studies on noisy information
processing [16] and polygenic mutation–selection balance
[17] have argued for the importance of constraints. Here we
summarise an emerging line of research that suggests an
alternative explanation: that many surprising features of
behaviour, which may at first appear irrational, can in fact
be understood as the result of ecologically rational decision
rules adapted to exploit environments that vary in space
and time. The approach we describe is an extension of
standard techniques [18] used in behavioural and evolu-
tionary ecology to investigate the adaptive significance of
animal behaviour. This approach does not assume that all
behaviour is adaptive or that constraints are unimportant,
but instead seeks to identify how natural selection shapes
the decision rules underlying behaviour [19,20]. The impli-
cations of this work for understanding cognitive systems
have been largely overlooked, because theoretical models
and laboratory experiments alike have traditionally
focused on highly simplified situations that fail to capture
some of the important complexities of the environments in
which organisms have evolved.
The limitations of simple models
Simple mathematical models are of great value in beha-
vioural and evolutionary ecology, where the techniques of
game theory and optimisation are used to predict the
endpoints of natural selection [21]. This approach has
revealed some important general principles of how organ-
isms (including humans) should choose between different
options, from food items to potential mates to the age at
first reproduction. Most evolutionary models of decision-
making consider a highly simplified environment in which
the availability of different options is known to the organ-
ism and does not change over time. This is of course an
unrealistic assumption. In most natural environments, the
availability of different options fluctuates in time and
space, and the fluctuations are often unpredictable.
That mathematical models simplify and abstract the
phenomena they aim to represent is not in itself a problem;
indeed, this is precisely what models are designed to do,
because a model that was as complex as the real world
would be of little use. But there is a danger of over-
simplification [22] (‘Einstein’s razor’ [23]): if we simplify
things too much, we may fail to capture crucial features of
natural environments that are needed to understand the
behaviour.
The power of simple experiments
Similarly, laboratory experiments place individuals in
artificial situations that are far simpler than most situa-
tions encountered in the natural world. In many of the
standard laboratory protocols routinely used in beha-
vioural ecology and experimental psychology, subjects
are trained and tested using a small number of behavioural
options, with straightforward relationships between the
available stimuli, the actions of the subject and the result-
ing consequences [24–27]. In these artificial situations the154experimenter has created a deliberately simplified version
of the types of problems the animal might encounter in its
natural environment; the aim is to isolate the key variables
needed to understand the behaviour. As with the simplified
models discussed earlier, there is a risk that such labora-
tory settings may not reflect the statistical structure of the
environment to which the animal is adapted, making it
seem as though the animal is making errors [4]. However,
if we recognise this problem, then deviations from rational
behaviour in simplified laboratory set-ups can be illumi-
nating because they may reveal unexpected biases that
arise from rules adapted to the natural environment.
Irrational behaviour from ecologically rational rules
Natural selection will tend to produce decision rules which,
although not optimal, perform well in the types of situa-
tions the individual normally encounters [19,20,28,29];
that is, they should be ecologically rational [30]. The
statistical properties of environments, including the dis-
tribution of resources and how that changes over time,
favour particular decision rules. For example, noisy miners
(a type of bird) change their foraging strategy depending on
the resource they are exploiting: they use movement-based
rules when searching for invertebrates, which are cryptic
and highly mobile, but switch to using spatial memory
when searching for nectar, which is found only in fixed,
conspicuous locations (flowers) and is quickly depleted [31].
The ecological and evolutionary context is crucial; animals
follow decision rules that are adapted to the statistical
properties of the resource types commonly encountered
during their evolutionary history. In novel experimental
contexts lacking this structure, such ecologically rational
rules may lead to biased or irrational behaviour.
When seeking to understand how natural selection
has shaped decision rules, it can be instructive to use a
form of reverse engineering. This process starts with the
identification of some bias that is not accounted for by
current theory. The next step is to consider which parti-
cular aspects of environmental complexity need to be
included in the models to predict that bias. The aim is to
identify the minimal amount of real-world complexity
that is sufficient to account for the observed behaviour,
thereby forming a basis for novel predictions that can be
used to test the proposed explanation. Models developed
in the past few years illustrate the power of this
approach and highlight spatiotemporal heterogeneity
and autocorrelation as two important factors affecting
the psychology of humans and other animals (Figure 1).
Incorporating these factors into standard models can
explain several biases, listed in Table 1, that appear
irrational in more simplified environments.
Spatiotemporal heterogeneity
Conditions in most natural environments are not uniform
but vary over time and space. For highly mobile organ-
isms, these two forms of heterogeneity will typically be
closely linked; an individual moving through a spatially
heterogeneous environment will encounter temporal
heterogeneity too. Spatiotemporal heterogeneity has
important consequences for behaviour because in a het-
erogeneous world the optimal response of an individual to
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Figure 1. Incorporating spatiotemporal heterogeneity and autocorrelation into standard evolutionary models can account for several cognitive biases and puzzling features
of behaviour. The Venn diagram indicates which combination of factors can produce particular outcomes; the phenomena discussed in this paper are shown in bold type. In
a heterogeneous world the environmental conditions change over time or space (e.g., between states A and B), with positive autocorrelation implying that conditions are
more likely to stay the same (thicker arrows) than change (see also Box 1). Some of the adaptive explanations we discuss are extensions of standard state-dependent
models of behaviour [18] (shown in plain font). Some are based on uncertainty about current conditions and/or the pattern of environmental change [93]. Possible
directions for future work are shown in italics.
Table 1. Biases that seem irrational in a simplified world
Bias Description Why does it seem irrational?
The placebo effect [5] Medicinally inert substances or fake treatment
procedures enhance recovery
Individual who is capable of recovery without external
help should do so immediately
Optimism [40] and
pessimism [42]
Individual behaves as though conditions are better
(optimism) or worse (pessimism) than they actually are
Rational decision-maker should base behaviour on an
unbiased (Bayesian) estimate of current conditions
The ‘hot-hand’ fallacy [6] Misinterpretation of a statistically independent
sequence of successes as a run of good form
In a sequence of trials known to be independent (e.g.,
roulette), estimated chance of success should not be
influenced by outcome of previous trial
Intransitive choice [63] Individual prefers option A over option B, and option B
over option C, but prefers C over A
Inconsistent with absolute valuation of options, which
would imply that if A > B, and B > C, then A > B > C
Violation of regularity [61] Preference for one option over another is reversed by
presence of a third option
Inconsistent with absolute valuation of options, which
would imply that ranking of two options is unaffected
by alternative options
State-dependent
valuation learning [69]
Individual prefers options they previously found to be
rewarding when in a state of need
Rational decision-maker should choose whichever
option gives greatest benefit, irrespective of past states
Successive contrast effects [72] Response to current conditions depends on whether
conditions in the past were better or worse
Rational decisions should depend only on current
situation; how the decision-maker got there is irrelevant
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encounter in the (near) future [32–35]. The most basic
form of heterogeneity we can consider is where the con-
ditions at any one time or place are independent of those at
any other time or place (Box 1). This is only a crude
representation of the heterogeneity in most natural
environments (see next section), but it can already account
for some interesting biases:
The placebo effect
It is a widely reported (though controversial [36,37]) find-
ing that fake treatments such as sugar pills or sham
surgery, known as placebos, can lead to improvement in
a patient’s health [38]. Although health improvement is of
course beneficial to the patient, if they are capable of
recovering without help it would seem rational to do so
immediately, rather than waiting for an external, inert
cue. In an environment where conditions change over time,
however, a delayed response may be adaptive. If an indi-
vidual falls sick when conditions are harsh, it may be worth
waiting until the environment is perceived to be lesschallenging, when it will be less costly to mount an immune
response. Recent theory [39] has shown that the optimal
strategy for recovery depends on the beliefs of the patient
about current and future conditions, which affect the rela-
tive benefits of investing in recovery now rather than later.
From this viewpoint, placebos falsely alter the expecta-
tions of the patient regarding the costs and benefits of
putting effort into recovery, in some cases triggering an
immediate response (i.e., a placebo effect). The placebo
effect itself is not adaptive, but a generalised response
to external cues may be favoured by natural selection if, on
average, those cues reliably indicate a change in environ-
mental conditions.
Pessimism
Natural selection should, in general, produce behaviour
that is appropriate for the environmental conditions, giv-
ing the impression that individuals ‘know’ what those
conditions are even if they cannot perceive them directly.
Sometimes, however, humans and other animals consis-
tently behave in a way that does not maximise their155
Box 1. Modelling environmental heterogeneity and autocorrelation
Incorporating environmental heterogeneity into models of adaptive
behaviour requires the inclusion of an environmental state variable.
Often we can capture sufficient complexity with only two environ-
mental states A and B, such as high and low food availability, or safe
and dangerous. Next, we characterise stochastic transitions between
the environmental states. The simplest case is where the probability
of transition (per unit time) between states depends only on the
current state (Figure Ia), because then we can write the transition
probabilities as single values cA and cB (the subscripts indicating the
current state), with cA + cB < 1 representing positive temporal auto-
correlation. The length of time the environment stays in state i then
follows a geometric distribution with mean ti = 1/ci. We assume that
the individual ‘knows’ (i.e., is adapted to) these probabilities and can
directly perceive the current conditions. We then investigate how
environmental heterogeneity affects responses to current conditions,
such as predation risk [49]. For a finer gradation of states, this
approach can be extended to any number of states n, with an n  n
matrix of transition probabilities. For some systems, such as gradual
changes in the food supply, we set all the probabilities of moving
between non-adjacent states to zero.
Individuals will often be uncertain about the transition probabil-
ities, and we may be interested in how they should respond to this
uncertainty. A simple representation considers two possible
transition matrices (e.g., fast- or slow-changing conditions). The
individual may ‘know’ the transition probabilities of each matrix,
but not which matrix currently applies (Figure Ib). If the environ-
ment is temporally autocorrelated, then the recent past is
informative of the future, and therefore the individual should
adjust its behaviour in response to its previous experience of the
pattern of change. An optimal decision-maker would learn from
past experience using Bayesian updating [93]. We can model this
by including a state variable to represent the probability that one
particular matrix applies, which can help to explain apparently
irrational behaviour such as contrast effects [73].
The above assumes that the individual can accurately perceive
whether the environmental state is currently A or B. To explore a
situation where the individual knows neither the current conditions
nor the transition probabilities with certainty, we can use an
additional variable to represent the probability of a given situation.
However, note that learning two interdependent probabilities requires
three state variables and a very fine grid size; computational
limitations may constrain our approach.
We have described the simplest scenario for modelling temporal
autocorrelation in a heterogeneous world. Real environments may
show more complex patterns of change, but this is a mathematically
convenient way to capture some of the statistical structure that could
be important for understanding cognitive adaptations.
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Figure I. Flow diagram showing the dynamics of environmental state in a model of
a heterogeneous, temporally autocorrelated world. (A) In the simplest case, there
are only two environmental states (here, A and B) and a constant probability ci of a
change from the current state i. (B) If the transition probabilities are uncertain, we
can consider two possible situations (here, 1 and 2) representing different patterns
of change between A and B; the environment may switch from situation j to the
alternative situation with probability dj. The relative magnitudes of ci and dj reflect
our assumptions about the persistence of the two situations (e.g., habitat quality)
relative to heterogeneity in current conditions (e.g., food availability). For example,
a very small dj might be used if the pattern of change tends to be stable over the
lifetime of an individual. More complex scenarios are possible in which d also
depends on the current environmental state (A or B).
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gains if conditions were better than they actually are
(an ‘optimistic’ bias) [40,41] or worse than they actually
are (a ‘pessimistic’ bias) [42–44]. Recent theoretical work
[45] shows that temporal heterogeneity across generations
can select for pessimism: behaviour should be biased
towards the response that yields the best results in poor
conditions – because it is poor conditions that have the
strongest influence on long-term fitness across multiple
generations. Other factors, including autocorrelation (see
below), may alter the tendency towards optimism or pes-
simism (Box 2).
Spatiotemporal autocorrelation
Environments that are spatiotemporally heterogeneous
may also show positive autocorrelation, in that the condi-
tions at a given place and time tend to be similar to those at
nearby locations and in the recent past (Box 1). One well-
known adaptation to spatial autocorrelation is area-
restricted search [46], in which successful discovery of
an item prompts intensive local searching [47], thereby
promoting efficient exploitation of clumped resources
[48]. The impact of temporal autocorrelation is less well156appreciated, but may be even more important for under-
standing cognitive adaptations. In environments that
change over time the strength of temporal autocorrelation
– and hence the time for which current and future condi-
tions persist – has important consequences for adaptive
behaviour [49] and learning [50], and this is reflected in our
cognitive systems.
When there is temporal autocorrelation, current condi-
tions not only determine the consequences of current deci-
sions but are also informative of future conditions. This
important insight can account for several well-known
biases:
The ‘hot-hand’ fallacy
In gambling and sports, there is a widespread but often
mistaken belief that players have ‘streaks’ or ‘runs’ of
success. Basketball players, for example, are perceived
to be more likely to shoot successfully if their previous
shot hit rather than missed, whereas real data show that
the chances of scoring are statistically independent from
one shot to the next [51]. This so-called ‘hot-hand’ belief
reveals our tendency to see patterns even when none exists
[52]. It has been argued that this tendency represents a
Box 2. The evolution of optimism and pessimism
Consider an environment composed of a large collection of discrete
patches. Individuals mature on a patch, reproduce, and die. Some of
their offspring disperse to other patches. Patches change over time,
independently of one another; in some generations conditions are
good, in other generations poor. Whether optimal behaviour
appears unduly optimistic or pessimistic that conditions are good
depends on the degree of dispersal and autocorrelation [45]:
(i) When dispersal between patches is low, pessimism is favoured;
individuals must behave conservatively in case conditions
deteriorate and the whole lineage is wiped out.
(ii) When dispersal rates are higher, dispersal acts as an insurance
against a local patch deteriorating, spreading the risk between
members of the same lineage, such that individuals no longer
need to be conservative. If conditions are positively autocorre-
lated in time there is a ‘multiplier effect’ [94], with descendant
numbers growing rapidly in a patch over successive generations
if conditions are good. Individuals should then take a risk and
behave optimistically so as to exploit conditions if these turn out
to be good, because behaviour in good conditions has a
predominant influence on long-term fitness [45].
It can also be optimal to be optimistic about the chances of
survival. Imagine an animal that has to survive a given period of T
days if it is to reproduce. Suppose that the density of predators
varied during the evolutionary history of the population, and that
there are no cues that provide direct information on the density on a
given day. Then the frequency with which different levels of
predation occurred in the past specifies the current probability
distribution of predation levels. Do we expect anti-predator traits
(e.g., cautious behaviour) to evolve so that individuals maximise
their expected daily survival given this distribution? It depends [75]:
(i) If T = 1 or predator density on successive days is independent,
then the answer is yes.
(ii) However, if T > 1 and predator density on successive days is
positively autocorrelated, then individuals do best to be
optimistic about risk. To understand this, consider the extreme
case in which T is large and predator density is the same on all
days, either always high or always low. If the density is high, the
individual will almost certainly die regardless of its anti-predator
trait, whereas if it is low the trait value matters. Thus the trait is
only really relevant when the density is low, and therefore it
should evolve to be optimal given a low density [75] – that is,
behaviour should appear to be optimistic about predation risk.
Weaker autocorrelation in the predator density across succes-
sive days will favour a weaker optimistic bias towards the
optimal response for low density.
Box 3. Violations of regularity and transitivity
A central tenet of studies of decision-making is that in the absence
of constraints or costs, decisions should be transitive and regular
(see Glossary) in sequences of choices (cf in one-off choices, as
required by rational choice theory). In an autocorrelated world, this
is not necessarily true.
Foragers often face a choice between options that differ in both
the expected rate of energy gain and the risk of predation, which
may be positively related. What is the strategy that maximises long-
term survival? At high reserves, they should choose options with a
low predation risk; at low reserves, to avoid starvation they should
choose options with a high probability of energy gain. For
intermediate reserve levels, the best option depends not only on
the immediate danger but on the longer-term risk of starvation. If
options persist into the future, this risk depends on which other
options are currently available; options that are not currently chosen
may still affect optimal decisions because they can act as insurance
against an energetic shortfall in the future. For example, a
dangerous but high-gain option should be avoided when the
individual is well fed, but can be relied on in an emergency if
reserves drop to critically low values. In the absence of this
insurance option, the individual may be forced to choose riskier
foraging options than it would do otherwise, to keep its energy
reserves at a safe level. The value of a given option is therefore
affected by the presence of other options, which can lead to
violations of regularity [65] and transitivity [66] under optimal
behaviour. Recent models predict that violations may occur even in
cases without state-dependence, where the animal is simply
maximising its rate of energy gain [95].
Without autocorrelation, the presence of one option would not
affect the value of another. Waksberg et al. [96] argued that irregular
choice could outcompete rational behaviour in a model with no
autocorrelation, but they considered a restricted set of decision
rules that did not allow the choice of an individual to depend on its
current energy reserves [97]. This set does not include the optimal
decision rule. In evolutionary models of decision-making that
account for heterogeneity, it is important that the best-performing
decision rule is optimal over some sufficiently long timescale,
otherwise we cannot argue that it would have evolved [76].
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most resources are clumped (i.e., positively autocorrelated)
in space and time [4,53,54]. Thus the hot-hand fallacy could
result from a generalised decision rule that is unable to
distinguish sequences of genuinely independent events
from autocorrelated sequences. Experimental evidence
from computer-based ‘foraging’ [53] and gambling [54]
tasks largely supports this view, and suggests that human
minds have evolved to expect temporal autocorrelation in
the world.
Intransitive and irregular preferences
In an autocorrelated world, the possibility that current
behavioural options will persist into the future can affect
patterns of choice. Rational choice theory holds that the
preference for one option over another should be both
transitive and independent of irrelevant alternatives
(see Glossary); satisfying the axioms of this theory is both
necessary and sufficient to maximise expected benefit [55].
Studies of consumer behaviour [56] and experiments on
humans [8–10] and a diverse range of other organisms[13,57–63] have found evidence for context-dependent pre-
ferences that appear to violate these axioms of rational
choice (however, see [64]). However, empirically observed
choices are part of a long sequence of choices that indivi-
duals make throughout their lives, whereas the axioms
refer to one-off choices (which can be choices between
alternative decision rules that specify what to do in every
possible situation an individual might encounter in its
lifetime). In repeated choices, mathematical models
[65,66] show that violations of transitivity and regularity
can result from decision rules adapted to heterogeneous,
autocorrelated environments, in which currently available
options provide information about what options will be
available in the future (Box 3).
State-dependent valuation learning
The energetic state of an individual reflects recent foraging
conditions, and can therefore inform it about future con-
ditions in an autocorrelated world. Laboratory studies on
birds [67], insects [68], and fish [69] have shown that the
value animals place on different options depends on the
state they were in when they learnt about those options.
When given a choice between two food sources, animals
consistently choose the one they previously found to be
rewarding when they were hungry, despite the alternative
having equal [67] or even higher [70] profitability.157
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this biased valuation appears irrational, it can make sense
in particular types of environments that fluctuate slowly
between rich and poor conditions. If the best option differs
between rich and poor conditions, but individuals cannot
perceive the conditions directly, state-dependent valuation
learning is expected to evolve: food rewards should be more
strongly reinforcing when an individual has low energy
reserves, which are indicative of poor conditions. Selection
favours this bias in the learning rule because making the
correct choice under poor conditions is particularly impor-
tant for fitness [71].
Successive contrast effects
If an individual is uncertain about the temporal pattern of
change in conditions, future expectations may also be
influenced by conditions experienced in the past. Standard
theories of rational choice posit that optimal behaviour is
path-independent, in that it depends on the current state of
the world but not on how that state was reached. If we
equate current state with current environmental condi-
tions, this view cannot account for successive contrast
effects, in which the response of an individual to current
conditions depends on whether conditions were previously
better (a negative contrast effect) or worse (a positive
contrast effect) [72]. Such sensitivity to change can be
understood by recognising that many animals have
evolved in an environment where conditions fluctuate over
time in an unpredictable way. Assuming the pattern of
change is sufficiently stable, the conditions experienced in
the past then provide potentially valuable information
about the likely pattern of change in the future, which
in turn affects optimal behaviour (see Box 1). This depen-
dence of optimal behaviour on past experiences can pro-
duce positive and negative contrast effects in the artificial
situations used in laboratory studies [73]. Similar effects
could result from an optimal trade-off between exploration
and exploitation in heterogeneous, autocorrelated envir-
onments [74].
Optimism
Temporal autocorrelation across generations may also be
important. If there is spatial heterogeneity in environmen-
tal conditions, and those conditions persist over multiple
generations (i.e., temporal autocorrelation is sufficiently
high), optimistic behaviour is favoured [45] (cf pessimism
when temporal autocorrelation is weak; see previous sec-
tion). Alternatively, uncertainty about an external, auto-
correlated mortality risk can favour optimism [75] (Box 2).
Such cognitive biases may appear irrational, but they arise
from a strategy that maximises fitness over a longer time-
scale [76].
As these examples illustrate, some apparently mala-
daptive behaviours observed in artificial laboratory situa-
tions can be seen as ecologically rational if we recognise
that organisms are adapted to stochastically fluctuating
conditions that are autocorrelated in time and space. By
interacting with this rich statistical structure, organisms
have evolved to exploit their natural environments effi-
ciently using a range of simple decision rules that need not
require complex computation [77,78]. It is important to158recognise that such rules may lead to outcome biases in
environments that lack this statistical structure. For
example, standard laboratory procedures for demonstrat-
ing successive contrast effects eliminate any correlation
between past and future conditions; an ecologically
rational decision rule adapted to exploit this correlation
will produce apparently irrational behaviour [73].
Similarly, in tests of context-dependent choice the current
options do not predict which options will be available in the
future, but the animal may be responding as if they do
[65,66] (see Box 3).
From ‘just-so’ stories to predictions and empirical tests
In the approach we have outlined the aim is to build
evolutionary models with the minimal amount of real-
world complexity to account for observed patterns of deci-
sion-making. Nevertheless, identifying one potential adap-
tive explanation does not rule out the existence of other
explanations that may account for the observed bias
equally well. To move beyond adaptive story-telling, mod-
els should generate testable predictions as well as expla-
nations. In particular, evolutionary models of biases in
decision-making should identify which factors affect the
magnitude of the bias, and therefore the organisms and
circumstances in which the bias should be most pro-
nounced.
Although the evolutionary roots of many biases appear
to run deep, there is evidence of considerable variation
between species. For example, studies have found evidence
of successive contrast effects in honeybees, bumblebees,
starlings, and a variety of mammals, but not in goldfish,
toads, pond turtles, chickens, or pigeons [79]. This varia-
tion could reflect phylogenetic inertia [80] in the under-
lying neuroendocrine mechanisms that constrain
behaviour [81], or ecological differences between species
that select for different decision rules [82]. A general
expectation of the theories we have reviewed here is that
many biases will be most pronounced in species adapted to
strongly fluctuating environments, where the fluctuations
have a big impact on optimal behaviour. We might there-
fore expect some biases to be stronger in animals reliant on
tightly clumped, ephemeral food sources (e.g., specialist
frugivores and nectarivores) than in those adapted to
stable, widely available resources (e.g., grazing herbi-
vores). To test such broad-scale, comparative predictions
we need quantitative data on variation in biases across
species (controlling for selective reporting [83]) and
detailed information on the spatiotemporal structure of
natural environments (including social dynamics, for
which ‘reality mining’ techniques [84] hold great promise).
Differences in feeding ecology have been proposed to
explain variation in impulsive behaviour across primates
[85]; a more in-depth approach using detailed ecological
data might help in understanding the taxonomic distribu-
tion of other behaviours that at first appear irrational.
Another exciting possibility is to test the evolutionary
predictions experimentally by manipulating the pattern of
environmental change. Taking the simplest case of two
environmental states (e.g., high versus low food availabil-
ity), exposing different experimental groups to different
transition probabilities (see Box 1) could potentially
Box 4. Outstanding questions
 A major theme of the recent theoretical work discussed here is that, in
a temporally autocorrelated world, current or past options may be
informative about the future. This general principle may shed light on
decisions in a range of other situations, such as a choice between
risky options (i.e., options for which the outcome is variable).
Prospect theory is a highly influential descriptive model of human
decision-making that captures several interesting features of our
attitudes to risk [98], such as our tendency to focus more on changes
in state (e.g., wealth) than the states themselves. Could this pattern of
decision-making be ecologically rational in an autocorrelated world
(see Box 1)? If conditions fluctuate over time, organisms may need to
take into account the pattern of change to decide whether it is worth
gambling on a risky but potentially highly rewarding option.
 How does natural selection shape the mechanisms involved in
decision-making? Most models of adaptive decision-making focus
on behaviour, ignoring the psychological and physiological
mechanisms that produce it. Even so, observed behaviour may
be consistently associated with particular psychological and/or
physiological states, and therefore to understand decision-making
properly we need to model the evolution of these mechanisms
explicitly [19]. This can be technically challenging and typically
involves computationally intensive methods such as genetic
algorithms (e.g., see [99]), but modern computing power is
beginning to bring these approaches within reach.
 Studies of the evolution of psychological mechanisms may hold the
key to unravelling some of the most enduring mysteries of the human
mind, such as why we have emotions and moods. Do affective states
enhance or constrain decision-making? One idea is that mood states
are an efficient way of summarising recent experiences and can be
used to adjust decision thresholds, which might be adaptive in a
stochastically changing, autocorrelated environment [100–102] (see
Box 1). Whether emotions and moods are closely linked to brain
mechanisms that promote survival and other fitness components is
unclear [103], but this remains a promising direction for future
research.
 One of the key challenges of a comparative, evolutionary approach to
cognitive biases is how to identify analogous outcome biases in non-
human organisms. To allow valid comparisons, behavioural mea-
sures need to be both ecologically relevant and applicable to a wide
range of taxa. Tests have been devised for impulsive behaviour
[104,105] and for optimistic and pessimistic biases [15,106], but what
are the behavioural indicators of affective states such as anxiety,
depression, or disappointment? Researchers are beginning to tackle
this difficult problem [44,107,108], but much remains to be done.
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences March 2014, Vol. 18, No. 3generate different biases in decision-making, providing
that the study organism can adapt behaviourally to the
pattern of change. Many of the examples we have discussed
involve adaptation over an evolutionary rather than a
behavioural timescale, but even then it might be possible
to test hypotheses using experimental evolution in Droso-
phila, nematodes, or other organisms with a short genera-
tion time. We hope researchers using these systems will
take up this challenge.
Concluding remarks
The evolutionary explanations we have highlighted here
represent only one of several possible approaches to under-
standing biases in decision-making; it is important to
compare this framework with alternative approaches
based on genetic [17] or cognitive [16] constraints. None-
theless, we believe that insights from evolutionary studies
can make an important contribution to this issue by con-
sidering how organisms adapt to richer environments. The
simple models and experiments routinely used to study
decision-making may misrepresent key features of the
environment of selection, leading to incorrect predictions
and regular reports of seemingly irrational behaviour. The
real world can be complex, variable, and autocorrelated,
and we should expect cognitive and perceptual systems to
have evolved to exploit its statistical structure. By con-
sidering environments with sufficient richness we can
generate novel, testable explanations for many puzzling
behavioural and psychological phenomena, which can be
meaningfully tested even in simplified laboratory settings.
Much exciting work lies ahead (Box 4). A better under-
standing of the statistical structure of real-world environ-
ments may help us to understand the workings of the mind
[86–88].
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